Parametrizing Brexit: Mapping Twitter Political Space to Parliamentary Constituencies by Bastos, M. T. & Mercea, D.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Bastos, M. T. and Mercea, D. (2018). Parametrizing Brexit: Mapping Twitter 
Political Space to Parliamentary Constituencies. Information, Communication and Society, 
doi: 10.1080/1369118X.2018.1433224 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/18895/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2018.1433224
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
1 
 
Parametrizing Brexit: Mapping Twitter Political Space to Parliamentary Constituencies 
 
Marco Bastos (City, University of London) 
Dan Mercea (City, University of London) 
 
Accepted for publication in Information, Communication & Society 
(pre-publication version: some changes still possible) 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, a proof of concept study is performed to validate the use of social media signal to 
model the ideological coordinates underpinning the Brexit debate. We rely on geographically-
enriched Twitter data and a purpose-built, deep learning algorithm to map the political value 
space of users tweeting the referendum onto Parliamentary Constituencies. We find a significant 
incidence of nationalist sentiments and economic views expressed on Twitter, which persist 
throughout the campaign and are only offset in the last days when a globalist upsurge brings the 
British Twittersphere closer to a divide between nationalist and globalist standpoints. Upon 
combining demographic variables with the classifier scores, we find that the model explains 41% 
of the variance in the referendum vote, an indication that not only material inequality, but also 
ideological readjustments have contributed to the outcome of the referendum. We conclude with 
a discussion of conceptual and methodological challenges in signal-processing social media data 
as a source for the measurement of public opinion. 
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Introduction 
The referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union was the flashpoint of more than 
four decades of Euroskeptic politics contesting the country’s membership of the supranational 
organization (Becker, Fetzer, & Novy, 2016). The vote saw those efforts come to fruition as the 
British electorate was marginally in favour of leaving the E.U., thus opening a new chapter in the 
political life of the country (Asthana, Quinn, & Mason, 2016) which then embarked on a long 
process of defining a different relationship with the E.U. In this paper we seek to probe this 
epochal transformation in British political life by testing whether social media can offer a 
reliable signal for identifying political alignments as expressed on Twitter. To that end, we 
provide a proof-of-concept geo-locational analysis of political expression by the British citizenry 
on Twitter. 
Instead of approaching social media analytics as opinion polls, with disputed levels of 
reliability (Jungherr, Jürgens, & Schoen, 2012; Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, & Welpe, 2011), 
we examined Twitter data as legitimate manifestations of public opinion in the early 21st century 
(Anstead & O'Loughlin, 2015), similarly to scholarship investigating the public discourse in pre-
industrial bourgeois society of the 18th century that resorted to, and explored extensively, the 
circulation of information in discursive arenas such as Britain’s coffee houses, France’s salons, 
and Tischgesellschaften in Germany (Habermas, 1991). As such, the rationale for this study 
departs from endeavours seeking to forecast the results of the E.U. referendum using social 
media data as a predictor of voter turnout and party affiliation (Celli, Stepanov, Poesio, & 
Riccardi, 2016). 
In view of the alleged political realignment among Western electorates, we probed into 
the proposition that not solely material inequality, but also ideological readjustments have 
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contributed to the political outcome of the U.K. voting to leave the E.U. From this perspective, 
outrage at material inequality has been compounded by a reactionary cultural backlash that has 
been leveraged and maximized by populist parties and leaders (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). To test 
this proposition, we devised a conceptual model and a coding scheme to classify content along 
four ideological coordinates and subsequently trained a dedicated opinion-mining parametric 
algorithm. We rely on this classifier to analyse a large set of Twitter data collected during the 
referendum campaign. 
Twitter content was collected from a range of hashtags and keywords, including Leave 
and Remain campaign terms such as #takecontrol and #strongerin and terms that provided a 
forum for deliberating the referendum (i.e., “Brexit” and “referendum”). Twitter API was also 
queried to identify the location of users tweeting the referendum. The data we analyse in the 
following sections thus includes both ideological and geographic markers. We calculated the 
ideological leaning of users and subsequently mapped them onto voting constituencies in 
England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. As such, the unity of analysis is not tweets or 
users, but Parliamentary Constituencies from which we model the prevailing ideological 
landscape as articulated on Twitter in the run-up to the referendum. 
In summary, the deep learning algorithm devised for this study is optimized for 
identifying ideological affiliation, to pinpoint users’ views along a political value space mapped 
onto Parliamentary Constituencies, and to determine the fit between political expression on 
Twitter in the period leading up to the vote and the referendum result. In what follows we 
introduce the conceptual framework underpinning this analysis by unpacking the latent value 
space before demonstrating its potential for modelling the ideological coordinates of the Brexit 
debate. 
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Previous Work 
Scholarship informing this study stems from two bodies of literature. Firstly, recent surveys 
suggest that the British population perceive social media as an important complement to their 
vote, but they continue to occupy a lower position in the wider ranking of news sources covering 
elections (Dutton, Reisdorf, Dubois, & Blank, 2017). The sense that social media are nonetheless 
reshaping the media landscape with momentous consequences for democratic politics flows from 
the argument that either through a conscious choice or algorithmic filtering, users are narrowly 
exposed to information that reinforces their political outlook (Sunstein, 2007). Such selective 
exposure entrenches ideological polarization and forecloses reasoned deliberation (Dahlgren, 
2009). While evidence-based treatments of this topic have revealed that exposure to a plurality of 
political views is likely on social media (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015; Fletcher & Nielsen, 
2017), social dissemination of political content remains more likely among ideologically similar 
sources (Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015).  
Secondly, our research was informed by suggestions of a geographical and socio-
demographic patterning of voting preferences in the referendum reported in the U.K. press 
(BBC, 2016) and scrutinized by academics (Hanretty, 2017; Rennie Short, 2016). The geography 
of the vote, it was proposed, reflected a socio-economic imbalance between an affluent 
metropolitan elite clustered in and around London who voted to remain and parts of England and 
Wales that were economically worse off and voted to leave; and, secondly, a political cleavage 
between the seat of the U.K. government at Westminster, an increasingly independent-minded 
Scotland, and Northern Ireland whose economic prosperity and political stability have turned on 
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the existence of an open border with fellow E.U. member, the Republic of Ireland (Rennie Short, 
2016). 
This study examines public opinion on Twitter against this backdrop of ongoing shifts in 
deeply engrained ideological leanings (Kriesi & Frey, 2008), which reportedly came to a head in 
the course of the Referendum campaign (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). We sought to explore 
whether political talk on social media can quantifiably mirror this process. Specifically, we 
sought to examine the relationship between communication on social media and the electoral 
geography of the Brexit referendum to assess the extent to which users tweeting nationalist and 
populist content would overlap across geographic enclaves; and conversely, whether such pattern 
could be observed in relation to users tweeting globalist or economist content. In other words, we 
probed whether Twitter public stream can be used to identify, measure, and model the political 
consequences of an alignment between the vote and broader ideological orientations expressed 
by the British public opinion. 
Following this line of inquiry, the political geography of the plebiscite was unpicked at 
the level of local authority areas (Becker, et al., 2016). By means of a best subset selection 
machine learning protocol for Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression, Becker, et al. (2016) 
identified a collection of factors that correlated with the referendum outcome. While contending 
that a larger turnout in urban areas could have tipped the vote in the other direction, the authors 
highlighted that the vote to leave correlated positively with a vote for the Euroskeptic UK 
Independent Party (UKIP) and the British National Party in the 2014 European Parliament 
elections. Other important correlates of the vote leave were employment in the manufacturing 
sector, a comparatively lower hourly pay or a higher unemployment rate, the share of rented 
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council housing in the area, longer waiting times for access to the public health system, and 
lower levels of employment in the public sector.  
Demographically, a vote to leave rather than to stay in the EU correlated with the absence 
of educational qualifications and being 60 years of age or older (Becker, et al., 2016). 
Cumulatively and in accordance with the economic insecurity hypothesis, the socioeconomic 
variables were modelled by Inglehart and Norris (2016) in their analysis of the rise of populism 
in Europe. This supposition—the economic insecurity hypothesis—pertains to a marked decline 
in the fortunes of the blue-collar working class faced with contracting real incomes, narrowing 
access to public services such as health, education, housing, or social welfare in advanced post-
industrial economies. Their hardship has been attributed to a political inability to spread the 
economic benefits of an increasingly integrated global economy (Piketty, 2014). 
The authors juxtaposed the prevailing economic insecurity hypothesis to the thesis of a 
cultural backlash against progressive value change (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Their hypothesis 
is that socio-economic hardship and resistance to cultural change are mutually reinforced. The 
result is a cleavage between, on the one hand, the young and well-educated who embraced 
progressive post-materialist values foregrounding gender, sexual and racial equality, human 
rights, environmental protection, secularism, and a greater tolerance of migrants. The other side 
of the divide is occupied by older, less educated sections of the population who experienced a 
decline in their material conditions, along with the perception of gradual erosion of values 
associated with industrial societies and solidarity around socio-economic positions, religion, 
race, and geographic location. This section of the U.K. population saw the cultural politics of 
identity recognition as a threat to traditional values. Immigration further compounded the 
disaffection while the EU embodied a cultural threat posed by other European societies which 
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was felt most acutely among people on the lowest education and income levels, manual workers, 
and the unemployed (McLaren, 2002). 
 
Socio-economic and cultural realignment of British politics 
The scholarship reviewed above foregrounds the thesis that not only material inequality led to 
the result of the referendum, but also a cultural backlash by older, traditional, and less educated 
voters. This open value competition has augmented political polarization within parties based 
around cultural issues and social identities (Inglehart & Norris, 2016), a development that 
maximizes political cleavages and deepens the wedge separating culturally divisive issues. The 
Conservative Party, in particular, has embraced this cultural cleavage by incorporating a 
nationalist rhetoric in response to European integration and immigration, devolution, rising 
secularism, and receding influence in world politics (Kriesi & Frey, 2008). 
Political realignment is therefore a process that has been in train for some time, albeit 
masked by the U.K.’s majoritarian electoral system which kept in place the alternation in 
government between the two large parties (Dunleavy & Margetts, 2001). The electorate has 
broadly been divided along two cognitive dimensions: an economic and a cultural one (Kriesi & 
Frey, 2008). The former was dominant for more than two decades from the 1970s to the early 
1990s. The latter became increasingly prominent in the late 1990s and early 2000s. If on the 
economy voters were divided between supporting or reforming the welfare state, on the cultural 
dimension they were split between the espousal of, on the one hand, liberal political values, 
environmental protection, and support for European integration and, on the other, traditional 
values, “law and order,” and a concern with immigration (Kriesi & Frey, 2008, p. 197). 
8 
 
Kriesi and Frey (2008) also showed that Labour and Conservatives converged on a liberal 
outlook on the economy up to the 1990s, a point of departure when Labour voters became 
culturally more liberal while Conservatives embraced traditional conservative values. During this 
period Labour consolidated its foothold among the highly educated and the middle classes, 
whereas the Conservative Party attracted the least educated and the working classes through a 
combination of nationalism and cultural conservativism (Kriesi & Frey, 2008), a process 
heightened by the emergence of populist parties such as UKIP championing traditional values 
alongside “nationalistic and xenophobia appeals, rejecting outsiders and upholding old-fashioned 
gender roles” (Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p. 30). 
 
Coordinates of the Brexit Ideological Value Space 
The conceptual model comprises two axes opposing globalism to nationalism and economism to 
populism. There are three notable definitions of populism that have guided social science 
research (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Firstly, populism amounts to a movement 
galvanized by a hypnotic leader that crosses class boundaries; it is, secondly, a manner of doing 
politics that mainlines the relationship between political leaders and the electorate to the 
detriment of political parties. Thirdly, populism is a political discourse premised on the claim of 
greater authenticity in the representation of the experiences and beliefs of an oppressed majority, 
who sits in antagonism with a hegemonic minority (Laclau, 2005). These definitions have been 
thrown into question as political parties started to adopt a catch-all response to the erosion of 
their relationship with the electoral base (Kriesi & Frey, 2008), a process that conflated populism 
with demagoguery but also took it to the center stage of party politics. 
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Despite these developments that limited the analytical value of the concept to the point of 
being employed as a floating signifier, the three definitions of populism pivot on the variance 
between “the people” and “the establishment” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Asserting 
socio-economic, political, and cultural alienation, populist discourse further expresses this 
antagonism as geographical distance separating, for instance, loci of political and economic 
power such as Brussels, London, or the South-East of England from the rest of the U.K. (Wills, 
2015). The latter embodied a privileged and rootless cosmopolitan elite (Bauman, 2012)—
corporate or governmental—vilified as panderers to economic and political globalization 
personified by the E.U. and European integration (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, 
& Frey, 2008; Woods, 2009). 
Nationalist parties have channeled this disenchantment by capitalizing the skepticism of 
economic trade agreements, technological disruption, and the belief in a culturally and ethnically 
monolithic state. This homogeneous territory would, firstly, reassert its authority in the face of a 
perceived abdication of economic self-interest in trade liberalization agreements and, secondly, 
exert social control over labor migration flows that placed crippling pressure on the institutions 
of the welfare state (Mudde, 2000, 2004). Conversely, globalism, the third coordinate of the 
latent ideological space pertains to a rights-based universalistic worldview that regards 
individual citizens as free agents operating in a global economy of increasingly convergent 
national political systems (Turner, 2002). 
To summarize, in its more basic forms, populist messages advance a discontent directed 
at elites and the establishment and foreground popular will, while nationalist sentiments revolve 
around notions of national exceptionalism, sovereignty, and nativism (Parker, 2016). In 
opposition to that, a prevalent response to popular disenchantment has been a drive towards 
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greater efficiency in economic policy and analysis, policy-making, and government 
administration. This is the fourth coordinate in the latent ideological space which we term 
economism, conceived in opposition to populism and that emphasizes consensus building, due 
process of law, and accountability, but also expert analysis and evidence-based policy making 
that could drive consensus across ideological fault-lines (Nilsson & Carlsson, 2014). As such, 
economism refers to the comprehensive political consensus to safeguard free market economics 
embodied in government policy and the array of expert bodies—from the Bank of England to 
think-tanks, business, and trade organizations—which have helped define and uphold it in the 
last three decades (Crouch, 1997). Figure 1 shows the ideological coordinates and the political 
value space that serves as the analytical baseline for this study. 
 
Figure 1: Ideological coordinates of British public opinion and political value space  
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It is against this backdrop of political realignment that the use of social media and data analytics 
was portrayed as having facilitated accurate canvassing by, for example, the anti-establishment 
Vote Leave campaign (Cummings, 2016). Equally, social media data have been used to model 
the result of the vote on June 23rd based on agreement with the Leave or Remain campaigns 
expressed on Twitter (Celli, et al., 2016). Accordingly, we sought to model the political debate 
on Twitter in the weeks leading up to the vote and subsequently mapped the value space onto 
Parliamentary Constituencies (BBC, 2016; Becker, et al., 2016; Hanretty, 2017; Rennie Short, 
2016). We tested the hypothesis that an economist and globalist discourse would cluster around 
affluent metropolitan areas with a higher-than-average concentration of groups who have reaped 
the economic, political, and social benefits of globalization. We concurrently test the hypothesis 
that economically fragile northern Britain would more readily embrace nationalist, anti-
immigration, and populist claims which amalgamate protectionist calls for Britain to shield itself 
from the global economy, to control flows of people, and to regain its national sovereignty from 
the E.U. 
More specifically, we test the hypothesis that the distribution of users advocating either 
side of the campaign mirrors the results of the referendum (H1). Further, we anticipate the latent 
ideological space underpinning the classifier maps onto the referendum results across 
Parliamentary Constituencies, namely along the Globalism-Nationalism polarity (H2), and the 
Economism-Populism axis (H3). In close relation, we conclude our analysis by modelling the 
dependent variable RemainPcnt (H4)―the percentage of vote of the Remain campaign―with a 
multiple regression model that incorporates the abovementioned independent variables 
(RemainLeave, GlobNat, and EconPop) along with demographic variables retrieved from 
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publicly accessible census data similarly mapped onto Parliamentary Constituencies (ONS, 
2011). In sum, the four central hypotheses tested in this study are the following:  
H1. The distribution of tweets advocating either side of the campaign matches the vote results 
across Parliamentary Constituencies (hashtags); 
H2. The distribution of Nationalist and Globalist tweets matches the vote results across 
Parliamentary Constituencies (classifier); 
H3. The distribution of Populist and Economist tweets matches the vote results across 
Parliamentary Constituencies (classifier); 
H4. Tweets mapped onto the ideological value space, combined with demographic variables, can 
account for geographic heterogeneity in the referendum results (multiple regression model). 
 
Data and Methods 
For the purposes of this study we relied on the Twitter Streaming and REST APIs to collect a 
total of 8,821,116 tweets using a set of keywords and hashtags, including relatively neutral tags 
such as brexit, referendum, inorout, and euref, but also messages that used hashtags clearly 
aligned with the Leave campaign: voteleave, leaveeu, takecontrol, no2eu, betteroffout, voteout, 
britainout, beleave, iwantout, and loveeuropeleaveeu; and hashtags clearly aligned with the 
Remain campaign: strongerin, leadnotleave, votein, voteremain, moreincommon, yes2eu, 
yestoeu, betteroffin, ukineu, and lovenotleave. Vocal hashtags supporting the campaigns are 
leveraged to identify messages advocating each side of the referendum: The Vote Leave or Vote 
Remain campaigns. We subsequently removed messages tweeted before 15 April 2016, the 
starting date of the official campaign period, and 24 June 2016, the end of the referendum 
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campaign. Messages flagged as likely to have been tweeted by bots were also removed (Bastos 
& Mercea, 2017). 
Next, we queried the Twitter REST API to retrieve the profile of users that tweeted the 
referendum. We managed to retrieve 95% of the user profiles that appeared in the data (794,949 
out of 834,878). Profile information, along with information tweeted by the users, was pivotal to 
identifying the location of the user base. We triangulated information from geocoded tweets 
(subsequently reverse-geocoded), locations identified in their user profile (then geocoded), and 
information that appeared in their tweets. The triangulation prioritizes the signal with higher 
precision, hence geocoded information is preferred if present. When not available, we look at the 
location field in users’ profiles and geocode that location. If neither source of information is 
available, we check for information in their tweets, but only in cases where the place_id field of 
the API response returns relevant information.  
As a result, a considerable portion of user locations in our dataset could be identified only 
to city or postcode level. Nonetheless, we succeeded at identifying the geographic location of 
60% of users that tweeted the referendum (482,193 out of 794,949) who form our population of 
interest. From this cohort of 482,193 users tweeting the referendum, only 30,122 were based in 
the U.K. Upon identifying the location of users, we removed user accounts located outside the 
United Kingdom or whose location we could not identify up to postcode level. This reduces our 
dataset to 565,028 messages or 11% of all collected messages; a sample of messages that is 
sufficiently large to allow for testing the hypotheses underpinning this study. 
 
Campaign Advocacy 
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For each tweet, we count the number of hashtags advocating the Leave and Remain campaigns. 
We tag the message as Remainer or Leaver based on the highest number of vocal hashtags used 
in association with each side of the campaign. Messages without hashtags advocating either side 
are tagged as Neutral. The frequency count is aggregated and used to calculate the affiliation of 
users that tweeted or retweeted hashtags advocating either side of the campaign. Highly 
polarized messages―i.e., tweets including several supporting hashtags―are however 
uncommon. For users championing the Vote Leave campaign, only 16% of their messages 
included more than one such hashtags. These messages are yet more uncommon in the vote 
Remain campaign, where only 2% of messages included more than one hashtag clearly 
associated with that side of the campaign.  
We conclude the identification of users campaigning for either campaign by calculating 
the mode or “mean campaign affiliation” of users based on the frequency of campaign-
supportive hashtags used throughout the period. The mean affiliation of users can only be 
calculated for accounts that actively participated in the referendum campaign on Twitter. In other 
words, only users that actively tweeted or retweeted content clearly aligned with one side of the 
campaign are identified in this step of the data processing. We believe this approach, grounded 
on the mean affiliation per user, reflects strong campaign membership with low probability of 
false-positives and below we detail how this measure compares with the variable returned by the 
machine learning algorithm. 
 
Brexit Classifier 
The Brexit Classifier is a machine learning algorithm that resulted from multiple tests to identify 
the four key ideological coordinates explored in this study. We relied on two expert coders who 
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classified 10,000 tweets along the ideological coordinates of Globalism, Economism, 
Nationalism, and Populism. We controlled for intercoder reliability by double-coding a random 
sample of tweets (N=100) repeatedly, and after four rounds we achieved a Krippendorff’s alpha 
of 0.94 for the complete value space, with alpha of 1 for the Globalism-Nationalism dyad and 
0.86 for the Economism-Populism polarity. We relied on this trained set of tweets to parametrize 
the machine learning algorithm using text vectorization (Selivanov, 2016), an approach 
purposefully-built for text analysis.  
Unlike frequency-based approaches to text classification, which simply compute the 
number of positive and negative words (or hashtags) and draw a conclusion based on the final 
sum, text vectorization is a deep learning algorithm that draws context from phrases. It is often 
deployed to analyze and classify large text corpora, including user feedback, reviews, and 
comments. The algorithm can handle linguistic variation and performs well with misspelled or 
poorly constructed sentences, a marker of Twitter communication, because it considers the entire 
body text of tweets to infer ideological inclination. It is independent from hashtags, though in the 
Brexit corpus we found hashtagged tweets to be more vocal and likely to display a clear 
alignment with one of the four ideological coordinates. As a result, and unsurprisingly, the 
algorithm consistently identifies campaign hashtags as valid indicators of tweets ideologically 
leaning towards a given position in the political value space.  
Training a machine learning algorithm is fundamentally a trade-off between recall, the 
number of correct results divided by the number of possible results, and precision, the ratio of 
positive and relevant matches. In other words, the more variables the algorithm has to identify 
(in our case there are four: globalism, economism, populism, and nationalism), the higher the 
likelihood that the algorithm will be unsuccessful. For the purposes of this study, the algorithm 
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needs to identify at least one and a maximum of two ideological coordinates, as the polarities 
globalism-nationalism and economism-populism are mutually exclusive. Given the disjoint 
assumption of the political value space, we maximized precision and recall by splitting the 
ideological value space along two polarities and training two separate algorithms later combined 
into a single classifier (i.e., the Brexit Classifier). This approach successfully returned 
substantially more relevant results while also returning most of the relevant results. 
We relied on the abovementioned set of 10,000 manually coded tweets to assign a value 
(positive or negative) to each of the concepts we have sought to map, with the algorithm 
calculating the probability of positiveness and negativeness for each ideological polarity 
(Globalism vs. Nationalism and Economism vs. Populism). For each ideological pair, the 
classifier returns a range of values from 0 (completely globalist) to 1 (completely nationalist), so 
that values from 0.45 to 0.55 are somewhere in the middle of this scale and assumed to be 
relatively neutral. The algorithm was trained using Document-Term Matrix (DTM), vocabulary-
based vectorization, and the TF-IDF method for text preprocessing. Figure 2 shows the area 
under the curve on train and test datasets for the Economism-Populism and Globalism-
Nationalism ideological pairs (AUC=0.8697 and AUC=0.901, respectively). The algorithm 
performed well for the set of 565,028 tweets explored in this study and we expect it to perform 
reasonably well in other national contexts in which nativist and populist sentiments might be 
emerging. In the last step of the classification, the algorithm calculates the best fit, projects the 
results along spatial coordinates comprising the four ideological dimensions, and estimate 
significant oscillations between any of the ideological pairs. 
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Figure 2: Area Under the Curve calculated from train and test datasets for the Economism-
Populism and Globalism-Nationalism ideological pairs 
 
Unit of Analysis: Council Wards and Parliamentary Constituencies 
To leverage the granularity of our data, we rely on previous research that successfully mapped 
the United Kingdom’s referendum on membership of the European Union―restricted to local 
authority level―to parliamentary constituency level using a scaled Poisson regression model that 
incorporates demographic information from lower level geographies. This approach relies on a 
principled method of areal interpolation to aggregate the results at ward or constituency level, 
along with voting estimates at the level of council wards for authorities that have not disclosed 
the results at such granular levels (Hanretty, 2017; Huyen Do, Thomas-Agnan, & Vanhems, 
2015). The processed referendum data is thus relatively granular with data down to the ward 
level in England, Scotland, and Wales. As the ward system does not exist in Northern Ireland, 
the data were aggregated at the Local Authority District, thus overcoming inconsistencies 
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between local authorities and successfully mapping postcodes to Parliamentary Constituencies. 
In short, we adopt ward level data when available and estimates of the referendum results where 
ward level data were not made available by the authorities. Such estimates advanced by previous 
research (Hanretty, 2017) allow us to investigate the extent to which the geographic distribution 
of tweets supporting each side of the campaign and voicing opinions attached to the ideological 
coordinates mapped in this study interact with the how constituencies voted in the referendum. 
 
Mapping Twitter Data to Council Wards and Parliamentary Constituencies 
Mapping geographically-rich social media data onto census area or electoral districts is 
challenging due to the hierarchical subdivision of U.K. local government areas into various sub-
authority areas and lower levels such as enumeration districts. As council wards comprise the 
most granular level to which we could retrieve results or estimates for the referendum vote, we 
sought to map referendum-related Twitter activity to this unit of geographic analysis. Therefore, 
we geocode and reverse-geocode the location of users that tweeted the referendum and 
subsequently match postcodes to wards and Parliamentary Constituencies using the database 
provided by National Statistics Postcode Lookup (ONS Geography, 2011). Twitter users are thus 
simultaneously matched to the fields OSLAUA, OSWARD, and the PCON11CD (Local 
Authority, Ward, and Constituency codes, respectively). The first field includes Local Authority 
District (LAD), Unitary Authority (UA), Metropolitan District (MD), London Borough (LB), 
Council Area (CA), and District Council Area (DCA). Where the council ward system does not 
exist (i.e., Northern Ireland), data were aggregated using these authorities to cover the entirety of 
the United Kingdom. 
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Upon geocoding the self-reported location of users, we found that only 30% of them were 
based in the U.K., with 19% of users that participated in the Brexit debate based in the U.S. and 
nearly 30% in other E.U. countries. Also surprising is the large geographic spread of the British 
Twitter user base, with London accounting for 14%, Lancashire 7%, Kent, Essex, West 
Yorkshire, and West Midlands ranging 3-4%, and South Yorkshire, Hertfordshire, Cheshire, 
Merseyside, Surrey, and Hampshire at 2% each. Taken together, each of these geographic groups 
are of comparable size to London in the share of users that tweeted the referendum. 
We ultimately consolidate referendum and Twitter data based on OSLAUA (Local 
Authorities) and PCON11CD, which is the standardized ID code for each Parliamentary 
Constituency, the only GSS (Government Statistical Service) beyond European electoral region 
that is available for Northern Ireland and is consistent across the four countries included in the 
United Kingdom (ONS Geography, 2017). Using postcode as the common geographic marker 
across databases, this last step of data aggregation allows for pairing Twitter and referendum 
data based on Local Authority District, each comprising a range of postcodes. We assigned 
pseudo codes when no postcodes or grid reference were made available by the authorities, 
particularly in the cases of the Channel Islands and Isle of Man. Data provided by the Office of 
National Statistics assigns the range E06 (UA), E07 (LAD), E08 (MD), and E09 (LB) to 
England; W06 (UA) to Wales; S12 (CA) to Scotland, and N09 (DCA) to Northern Ireland, with 
the pseudocodes L99 being assigned to Channel Islands and M99 to Isle of Man. Following these 
procedures, we first calculate the user-average score returned by the Brexit Classifier 
(Globalism, Economism, Nationalism, and Populism) and the mean campaign affiliation based 
on advocacy hashtags tweeted by users. 
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In summary, we calculate the mean campaign affiliation, mean globalist-nationalist, and 
mean economism-populism for each user that tweeted the referendum. Lastly, we match users to 
Local Authority Districts to test the hypotheses driving this study. Twitter data is therefore 
aggregate first at user level, and subsequently at constituency level, which is the unit of analysis 
employed in this study. The resulting dataset includes multiple streams of Twitter data 
consolidated into a single database of online and off-line activity at the constituency level: 
firstly, their ideological expression on Twitter, and secondly, their voting preferences relative to 
the 2016 U.K. E.U. membership referendum. 
 
Limitations of the Methods and Data 
There are important limitations associated with the ideological polarities developed for this 
study. Firstly, during the process of training the classifier we struggled to separate economism 
from populism, as many of the populist claims are economic in nature. This is reflected in the 
lower AUC score for Economism-Populism compared with Globalism-Nationalism. We 
addressed this challenge by accentuating the policy and expert-oriented component of the 
economism polarity, which sits in opposition to populist views that appeal to emotion and the 
perceived rights “of the people,” a value that is difficult to unpack but that stands visibly against 
the value space occupied by economism. Secondly, the clear identification of messages with 
nationalistic content has limited heuristic value, as nationalistic sentiments in Scotland and 
England refer to fundamentally different political agendas. Lastly, the various sampling 
techniques applied to the data, particularly the geographic rendering of user locations up to 
postcode level, reduced the universe of collected tweet to 11% of the dataset. We expect this set 
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of data to offer a defensible representation of the Brexit debate and our conclusions are 
conditional on these constraints. 
 
Results 
The dependent variable percentage of vote Remain (henceforth RemainPcnt) is positively 
correlated with the independent variables tested in this study: Globalism-Nationalism (henceforth 
GlobNat), Economism-Populism (henceforth EconPop), and RemainLeave, i.e., support for 
either campaign measured by advocacy-hashtags (r=.31, .46, and .26, respectively). The 
independent variable GlobNat refers to the polarity Globalism and Nationalism, in which a 
message with the highest Globalist content is rated 1 and a message with the highest Nationalist 
content is rated 0. The same scale applies to the variable EconPop, with the polarities 
Economism and Populism varying between 1 and 0, and RemainLeave, which is the average 
affiliation calculated per user, also normalized to a scale of 1 to the Remain campaign and 0 to 
the Leave campaign.  
We approach hypothesis H1 by exploring the similitude between the geographic 
distribution of politically-charged tweets and the geography of the vote, aggregated to the level 
of Parliamentary Constituencies. As detailed in the Methods section, we relied on hashtags 
unequivocally advocating either side of the campaign to generate a vector varying from 0 (total 
Leave support) to 1 (total Remain support). This variable (RemainLeave) is significantly 
correlated with the results of the vote (r=.26. p<.0001), but upon regressing the referendum 
results variable (RemainPcnt) on this explanatory variable we found that it can explain a modest 
6% of the variance found in the data (R2adj=.068, p=2.377e-11). Therefore, we reject hypothesis 
22 
 
H1 and conclude that the spread of hashtags advocating either side of the campaign is a poor 
predictor of the referendum outcome at granular levels such as Parliamentary Constituencies. 
Next we tested hypotheses H2 and H3 by investigating whether the distribution of 
Nationalistic and Globalist tweets mirrored the distribution of Remain and Leave vote across 
Constituencies. The two explanatory variables are significantly correlated with the results of the 
referendum (r=0.31 and 0.46, for GlobNat and EconPop, respectively, p<.0001), but it is the 
results of the regression that are particularly interesting. While the polarity Globalism-
Nationalism has a modest albeit significant explanatory power (R2adj=.10, p=9.226e-16), the 
polarity Economism-Populism explains over one fifth of the variance found in the results of the 
referendum (R2adj=.21, p<2.2e-16). Figure 3 shows how the classifier positioned each of the half 
a million tweets processed in this study with the fitted line representing the trend detected by the 
algorithm.  
 
Figure 3: Ideological value space calculated from Twitter messages. Blue line indicates the 
probability of nationalist versus globalist (a) and populist versus economist (b) sentiments, 
respectively. Plotted dots indicate the position of each of the half million messages 
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The classifier reported a strong nationalist sentiment in the data, which persists throughout the 
campaign and is only offset in the last days when a globalist upsurge brings the British 
Twittersphere closer to an equally partitioned divide between nationalism and globalism. For 
most of the campaign, the overall sentiment is decidedly nationalistic averaging .40, which 
translates to three quarters of messages having a nationalistic sentiment. On the Economism vs 
Populism spectrum the sentiment is reversed: most messages tweeted in the period (61%) are 
preoccupied with economic implications of the decision to leave the E.U. Though messages with 
a strong populist appeal account for less than 40% of the total messages, the trend shown in 
Figure 3 is of growing occurrence of populist messages in the weeks and days leading up to the 
vote, with messages centered on economic issues moving out of the debate as a populist 
discussion balloons. 
 Lastly, we test hypothesis H4 that the ideological value space can be combined with 
demographic variables to model public opinion formation relative to the referendum results 
(multiple regression model). We begin by regressing the vote results on the variables 
RemainLeave (support with vocal hashtags), the variables GlobNat and EconPop generated by 
the classifier, and the percentage of the population that is economically active in each 
Parliamentary Constituency. Except for GlobNat, all variables are deemed significant and the 
model explains about one quarter of the variance found in the results of the referendum (see 
Table 1). Next, we include a range of demographic variables and perform a stepwise model 
selection by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The returned stepwise-selected model includes 
an ANOVA component that rejects the variable GlobNat (due to low significance) and 
incorporates the variables unemployment, valid votes, electorate, and retired population, which 
unsurprisingly much improve the model. Electorate size and valid votes are variables that favor 
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urban areas (apart from London) where Twitter penetration is considerably higher (Pew Research 
Center, 2013), while economic variables such as unemployment and size of the retired 
population have been found to be associated with vote Leave (Becker, et al., 2016).  
 
Table 1: Models incorporating demographic variables, such as unemployment and economically 
active population, with the ideological value space on Twitter to explain the referendum results 
(a) 
Residuals:     
Min        1Q Median        3Q Max 
-0.30132 -0.06142   0.01312   0.07234 0.23328 
Coefficients:     
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)      3.664170    1.162669    3.152 0.00170 ** 
RemainLeave     -4.255821    2.525347   -1.685 0.09244 .   
GlobNat          0.124783    0.327011    0.382 0.70290     
EconPop         -1.540038 0.173522   -8.875 < 2e-16 *** 
econActivePcnt -0.003563    0.001174   -3.035 0.00251 ** 
Signif. codes:       
0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 0.1004 on 625 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.2317, Adjusted R-squared:  0.2268 
F-statistic: 47.12 on 4 and 625 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16 
(b) 
Residuals:     
Min        1Q Median        3Q Max 
-0.298907 -0.052397 0.008676 0.061566 0.225134 
Coefficients:     
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)      1.915e+00 5.156e-01 3.714 0.000222 *** 
RemainLeave     -2.385e+00 1.092e+00 -2.183 0.029404 *   
EconPop         -9.355e-01 1.400e-01 -6.681 5.26e-11 *** 
unempPcnt                 2.734e-02 3.444e-03 7.939 9.50e-15 *** 
Valid_Votes 1.975e-06 3.963e-07 4.984 8.09e-07 *** 
Electorate               -1.453e-06 2.722e-07 -5.339 1.31e-07 *** 
econInactiveRetiredPcnt   1.318e-02 1.139e-03 11.570 < 2e-16 *** 
Signif. codes:       
0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 0.08802on 623 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.4112, Adjusted R-squared:  0.4055 
F-statistic: 72.52 on 6 and 623 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16 
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When combined with the political value space mapped with Twitter messages, the model that 
incorporates demographic data accounts for nearly half of the variance found in the referendum 
results (R2adj=.41, p<2.2e-16). Table 1 shows that this model improves the previous one, which 
lacked demographic data, thus foregrounding the possibilities of complex social data modeling 
by mixing social media signal with demographic data that can be aggregated at user, group, or 
community levels. Although social media data remain a non-representative sample of the larger 
population, they can provide important markers for understanding the evolution of public debates 
and the geographic coverage of the discussion (Bastos, Recuero, & Zago, 2014). The results of 
the classifier also shed light on the importance of economic issues that might have been of vital 
importance to the user base tweeting the referendum, a component of the Brexit debate 
overshadowed by the much-discussed cleavage between the metropolitan elite in London and 
parts of England and Wales that were economically worse off.
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Figure 4: Mean score of Globalism-Nationalism (a) and Economism-Populism (b) for each 
Parliamentary Constituency and the results of the referendum (c) 
However, these results only partially support hypothesis H4―that the ideological value space 
can be used to model public opinion formation relative to the referendum results. More than half 
of the variance found in the referendum results remain unaccounted by the model and a closer 
inspection of the aggregate scores for Globalism, Nationalism, Economism, and Populism show 
that the map only partially matches the results of the referendum (Figure 4c). Apart from London 
and north-west Wales (Gwynedd), globalist messages are absent in Figure 4a, with nationalist 
content appearing in Scotland (which voted Remain, but has long contended with a nationalistic 
agenda pressing for an independent Scotland), the English Midlands, and the north of England. 
Populist messages are also relatively underwhelming covering only portions of the Midlands and 
North (Figure 4b). It is the economic discourse that is prevalent in the debate registered in the 
Twittersphere, being particularly prominent in Scotland, north-west Wales, and Greater London 
(Figure 4b). As an expression of the public opinion, Twitter debate appears invariably focused on 
economic and nationalistic issues as opposed to the populist and globalist sentiments thought to 
have shaped much of the referendum campaign (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The results reported in this study have partially upset our expectations. We did not find, for one, 
that economically fragile northern Britain was any more likely to embrace nationalist content. In 
fact, it was Scotland that appeared as a relatively fertile ground for nationalist messages. 
Furthermore, we rejected hypothesis H1 which posited that the distribution of users using 
hashtags to advocate either side of the campaign would mirror the results of the referendum. 
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These results contradict previous research that found the expression of agreement with a topic on 
Twitter to predict the results of the referendum (Celli, et al., 2016)―at least at more granular 
levels such as Parliamentary Constituencies. Although hypotheses H2 and H3 are partially 
supported, the distribution of globalist, nationalist, populist, and economist content is somewhat 
at odds with the geographic distribution of the Leave-Remain vote. More importantly, the 
significant results reported with the model tested for hypothesis H4 relies heavily on the AIC 
stepwise model selection that incorporated variables exogenous to the Twitter network such as 
unemployment, valid votes, electorate, and ratio of retired population living in the constituency. 
Twitter conversation in the weeks leading up to the referendum vote was largely centred 
on nationalistic and economic sentiments, a result that sheds light on the central research 
question investigated in this study―i.e., that not only material inequality, but also ideological 
realignments have contributed to the outcome of the referendum. On the one hand, the variables 
that have improved the model are associated with issues surrounding material inequality, chief of 
which are the percentage of economically active residents and the size of the parliamentary 
constituency. On the other hand, ideological orientation has also proven capable of explaining 
the unexpected outcome of the U.K. public to leave the E.U. As such, our results suggest that it 
was primarily outrage at material inequality along with a nationalistic upsurge that can help 
explain this epochal change in British politics (Inglehart & Norris, 2016), a result somewhat at 
odds with literature foregrounding the resurgence of populism in Western industrialized 
countries (Tollefson, 2016). 
In summary, we found evidence that nationalism was a quintessential component of the 
referendum debate during most of the campaign, with three quarters of messages having some 
degree of nationalistic sentiment embedded in them. These results however need to be 
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considered in the context of the limited heuristic value of this ideological coordinate. While the 
classifier successfully identifies nationalistic sentiments in Scotland and the Midlands, these 
areas have voiced fundamentally different versions of nationalism. In other words, although 
nationalism appears to have been a critical marker of the Brexit value space, there are important 
differences in Scottish and English nationalism that extrapolate the heuristic confines of the 
classifier. Populist messages, however, were decidedly of lesser importance compared with the 
sheer volume of tweets discussing the economic consequences of Britain leaving the E.U., a 
trend that is however inverted as we approach the date of the vote. 
 With this paper, we aimed to advance a proof of concept research design employing 
social media signal to model the ideological value underpinning the Brexit referendum outcome. 
The continuous streaming of Twitter messages can be leveraged to identify short and long-term 
shifts that are difficult to detect with surveys and interview instruments. As such, the rationale of 
the methodology advanced in this study is to employ social media data as geographically-rich 
intelligence that can be explored and combined with established social science research methods. 
The strength of the approach explored herewith lies less in its predictive or forecasting power 
(Jungherr & Jürgens, 2013; Jungherr, et al., 2012; Lazer, Pentland, Adamic, Aral, Barabási, 
Brewer, Christakis, Contractor, Fowler, Gutmann, Jebara, King, Macy, Roy, & Van Alstyne, 
2009) and more on the range of possibilities for exploring ongoing developments that would 
otherwise require the extensive, continuous, and expensive use of survey methodologies. 
Our analysis is notably restricted to the period of the campaign, with no insights as to 
how the debate evolved following the referendum. The data were also aggregated both at the 
geographic level (Parliamentary Constituencies) and on the temporal scale (no longitudinal 
variance was measured or incorporated into the model). Future research should explore the 
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temporal variation of ideological coordinates that can be continuously mined and detected with a 
machine learning algorithm such as the one trained for this study. While the fitted model 
presented herewith has limited explanatory power relative to the outcome of the referendum, 
greater variability in the opinions of users tweeting campaigns in the run-up to the vote could 
potentially be detected with such an approach. The temporal component of social media data 
could also be integrated into the model to explore relationships that might not have been possible 
to measure otherwise. In short, the results of this study present important insights into the 
reasons why the British public decided to end the country’s membership of the E.U., but future 
research should seek to further investigate the sentiments and ideological positioning that might 
have crystallized through the referendum debate. 
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